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Perceived Government Control and its Influence on Climate Change Knowledge
and Perceptions: Applications for Effective Communication
Abstract
Climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing the global agricultural food system at the current
moment. While scientists agree that anthropogenic climate change is a critical issue, many United States
residents remain skeptical, presenting a significant communication challenge. Understanding the factors
influencing public perceptions of climate change are essential to informing agricultural and environmental
communication efforts if they are to be effective at mitigating its effects. Previous studies have identified
political affiliation and ideology as key predictors for climate change perceptions; however, understanding
more detailed components of political ideology and affiliation could strengthen the predictive capacity of
these variables. The current study explored the predictive capacity of perceptions of government control
on environmental behavior related to political affiliation and ideology to inform effective communication
based on climate change knowledge. Using an online survey of U.S. residents, political ideology and
affiliation were found to be important predictors of climate change knowledge but including perceptions
of government control on environmental behavior expanded their predictive capacity. Agricultural and
environmental communicators are encouraged to integrate more nuanced components of political
affiliation and ideology, such as perceptions of government control, into their messaging strategies to
increase potential message uptake in the midst of a politically polarized media environment. Future
research should identify and explore other aspects of political affiliation and ideology, such as economic
and social factors, that may influence the public’s perception of climate change and its related policy
implications.
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Anthropogenic climate change impacts health, agriculture, food security, and national
security, making it a priority for global governance (Oreskes, 2018; Walsh et al., 2014). Despite
widespread global scientific consensus regarding its primary source, climate change remains a
controversial topic in the United States (U.S.; Jang & Hart, 2015). While 97% or more of climate
scientists support the notion of anthropogenic climate change, Pechar et al. (2018) found
between 33 and 50% of U.S. citizens denied climate change was caused by humans. The
observed gap between scientific and public opinion in the U.S. has consequences for evidencebased policy making, as policy implementation requires public support (Hart, 2011). Public
advocacy for climate mitigation strategies will likely play a large role in reducing carbon
emissions, but the gap between scientific and public opinion demonstrates a need for
communicators to identify potential obstacles to political engagement in public climate change
conversations (Hart & Feldman, 2016).
Science communication around environmental issues has primarily focused on
disseminating information to increase public engagement (Munshi et al., 2020). Known as the
deficit model, this approach assumes the gap between scientific and public perceptions can be
resolved by providing the public with more scientific information (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009).
The deficit model approach is limited, however, because audiences are not homogenous and
differences exist between social groups that impact message uptake (Merzdorf et al., 2019;
Munshi et al., 2020). In the case of climate change, less than 10% of the variance in climate
change perception is associated with knowledge (Merzdorf et al., 2019) compared to 50% of the
variance accounted for by individual experiences and sociocultural factors (van der Linden,
2015). Thus, climate change perceptions are not based on a lack of public knowledge; rather,
social groups influencing individuals' experiences and responses to environmental issues,
especially within the climate change debate (Munshi et al., 2020). Specifically, conventional
wisdom suggests socioeconomic and political groups have a significant impact on public
perceptions of climate change (Huber, 2020; Ma et al., 2019). Additionally, the specific frames
used within climate change messaging have been shown to influence individual’s behavioral
intentions and support for climate policy (Li & Su, 2018), highlighting the need for
understanding the complex components of political affiliation and ideology for structuring
climate change messages as to not use terminology not accepted by the target audience (Rohling
et al., 2016).
Mass media impacts the diffusion of climate science at the nexus of public discourse, the
scientific community, and sociopolitical domains (Hanson-Easey et al., 2015). The media
articulates and regenerates public opinion by acting as a discursive site for public debates on
scientific issues. Political polarization in the U.S. has culminated in a post-truth communication
environment, in which objective, factual information has less influence on public opinion than
emotional appeals or personal belief, further limiting the impact of the deficit model approach to
science communication (Merzdorf et al., 2019; Munshi et al., 2020).
Previous research has identified political affiliation and ideology as the most consistent
predictors of climate change belief (Bolsen & Druckman, 2018; Dunlap & McCright, 2008;
McCright & Dunlap, 2011). However, emerging studies suggest a lack of trust in climate science
may be due to an aversion to the message source or related policy implications (Huber, 2020;
Merkley & Stecula, 2018; Pechar et al., 2018). Trust in science, and thus a belief in a specific
scientific issue, may be contingent upon the issue, due to how the scientific evidence threatens
one’s worldview. Yet, the disproportionate attention to the partisan divide in climate change
discussions limits investigations into the impact of other factors on public perception (Pearson &
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Schuldt, 2015). Colvin et al. (2019) recommend the use of non-partisan and well-trusted
messengers to communicate about climate change and emissions-related topics; however,
because it can be difficult to identify those trusted messengers, more research is needed to
understand the different facets of political polarization in the context of climate change. The
purpose of this research was to explore the influence of perceived government control on climate
change perceptions and knowledge.
Literature Review
Many scholars have identified political affiliation and ideology as the most consistent
predictive factors for pro-environmental behavior, engagement in conservation efforts, and
climate change belief (Antonio & Brulle, 2011; Dunlap & McCreight, 2008; Gromet et al.,
2013). Political affiliation refers to a specific political party identification; where political
ideology refers to shared principles, beliefs, and values that influence worldviews (Botzen et al.,
2016). Within the context of the U.S., political party affiliation includes Republicans or
Democrats, while political ideology would encompass liberal to conservative beliefs. Generally,
Democrats/liberals believe in climate change and support related mitigation policies, while
Republicans/conservatives do not believe in climate change and reject related mitigation policies
on the grounds that they are economically detrimental (Bolsen & Druckman, 2018; Dunlap &
McCright, 2008; McCright & Dunlap, 2011).
Historically, research has narrowly operationalized political ideology within the U.S. as
party identification and differences between conservatives and liberals (Huber, 2020). According
to Merkley and Stecula (2018), “if the U.S. is to mobilize the cross-partisan societal consensus
necessary to effectively tackle climate change, it is essential [to] fully understand the factors that
caused Americans to polarize on climate science” (p. 269). Pechar et al. (2018) posited attitudes
toward government and corporations are important predictors of trust in science and belief in a
scientific issue. Attitudes toward government are one dimension of political ideology (Huber,
2020). The U.S. has a unique relationship with climate policy, being the only industrialized
country with a major political party “committed to preventing, and rolling back, all domestic
federal action on climate change” (Selby, 2019, p. 483). For conservatives, a key aspect of their
political worldview is to minimize the role of government in society (Cook & Gronke, 2005).
The more favorable an individual’s attitude is toward government, the more likely they are to
believe in climate change (Pechar et al., 2018). Attitudes toward government often align with the
types of science trusted by individuals due to their policy implications and can offer clearer
predictions for patterns of trust in science (Pechar et al., 2018).
The U.S. represents an informative example of political polarization of climate science.
Until the 1980s, support for environmental protection in the U.S. was mostly nonpartisan
(Dunlap & McCright, 2008). However, during the Reagan administration environmental
regulations were labeled as an economic burden; subsequently, President Reagan and his
administration attempted to weaken environmental policy and reduce its enforcement. The
political divide around environmental protection increased in the following decades (Antonio &
Brulle, 2011). Republicans mobilized in the 1990s to challenge climate science and policy,
which was reflected by public sentiment as voters took cues from party leaders (Dunlap &
McCright, 2008). The Republican takeover of the U.S. Congress in 1994, along with the election
of President George W. Bush, further amplified anti-environmental sentiment within the
Republican party. Specifically, the Bush administration exemplified strong ideological
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polarization around global warming, hostility toward climate policy, and misuse of climate
science (Dunlap & McCright, 2008).
Comparisons can be made between the Reagan and Trump administrations’
environmental policy approach (Hejny, 2018). The Trump administration, upon assuming office,
rolled back most of the Obama administration’s environmental policies, including eviscerating
the Clean Power Plan, funding cuts to the Environmental Protection Agency, and removing the
U.S. from the Paris Climate Agreement (Hejny, 2018; Huber, 2020). Additionally, motivations
for policy changes under the Trump administration were populist in nature, intending to sustain
status on the world stage (Huber, 2020; Selby, 2019). It can be categorized as a lack of trust in
the political establishment, with President Trump’s framing of the climate argument – as a hoax
to limit the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing within global markets –becoming a
predominant theme underlying conservative climate skepticism in the U.S. (Selby, 2019).
Building off the predictive capacity of attitudes toward government, few studies have
investigated how individuals’ environmental behaviors are impacted by governmental
approaches to environmental policy (Lavergne et al., 2010). Findings from Lavergne et al.
(2010) have indicated whether an individual perceives governmental action as supporting their
autonomy, or as controlling their behavior, impacts perceptions of policy implications. Given the
government is responsible for enforcing environmental regulations, individual’s perceptions of a
government’s autonomy-support or control may influence their motivation to engage in proenvironmental behavior. Perceptions of government autonomy-support contribute to higher
levels of autonomous motivation toward a behavior and lower levels of amotivation (Lavergne et
al., 2010). Perceived government control over environmental behavior is a dominant negative
predictor for motivation to engage in pro-environmental behavior (Lavergne et al., 2010).
Previous studies have identified gaps in climate change knowledge among the U.S.
public, leading to apathy towards climate friendly behaviors, skepticism, and lack of support for
mitigation policies surrounding climate change (Stevenson et al., 2014; Tobler et al., 2012).
Several misconceptions about climate change exist that are consistent over time and global in
nature, including the difference between weather and climate or ozone depletion and climate
change (Tobler et al., 2012). Climate change knowledge in the U.S. is often assessed in terms of
demographic characteristics, such as gender (e.g., McCright, 2010) and age (e.g., Leiserowitz et
al., 2011; Stevenson et al., 2014). However, simply increasing climate change knowledge among
the public may not provide support for mitigation policies but rather further polarize individuals
with worldviews that are threatened (Selm et al., 2019). Individuals who “subscribe to a
worldview that ties authority to conspicuous social rankings become less concerned about the
risks of climate change with increasing scientific literacy” (Selm et al., 2019; p. 2). In this
instance, individuals will use information that supports their worldview and opinion rather than
alter their worldview (Selm et al., 2019). Therefore, climate change knowledge needs to be
examined through perceptions of governmental control, political affiliation, and political
ideology.
Public support is critical for environmental policies targeting the reduction of the
negative impacts of climate change, especially for policies which may impose a financial burden
(Thaker et al., 2019). Scholars have suggested climate change denial is often rooted in opposition
to regulation (Merkley & Stecula, 2018). The literature indicates government decisions influence
motivations toward pro-environmental behavior, establish the connection between policy
perceptions, and ultimately public trust in science (Lavergne et al., 2010; Pechar et al., 2018).
Despite literature demonstrating connections between government perceptions, political
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ideology, and pro-environmental motivations, few studies explore the relationship between these
variables and knowledge of environmental issues. Steel et al. (2008) explored the extent to which
perceptions of environmental risk to the Great Lakes region are affected by policy-relevant
knowledge and political (value) orientations, suggesting that value orientations, rather than
knowledge, are more influential to risk perceptions than knowledge. McCright (2010) examined
climate change knowledge and concern but made comparisons based on gender, rather than
examining the role of knowledge in the development of perceptions of environmental issues and
political ideology. The majority of studies look at perceptions of the environment related to
political ideology and perceptions of government, excluding knowledge as a predictor variable
altogether (e.g. Cruz, 2017; Thaker et al., 2019). To date, little literature exists examining
perceptions of government control on both perceptions and knowledge of climate change.
Therefore, examining perceptions of government control on environmental behavior may
increase the current understanding of the role of ideology in the politicized climate change
debate and inform environmental communication efforts related to climate change perceptions.
Social Judgement Theory
Understanding attitudes and social norms are essential when communicating about
climate change, and social judgement theory (SJT) provides a theoretical framework for
conceptualizing messages in relation to specific audiences. Receivers of a message do not
evaluate the message solely on quality; rather, they draw upon various judgements, experiences,
and attitudes when assessing communication (Sherif & Sherif, 1967). SJT posits that people
make judgements toward a communication message by comparing their personal attitude or
belief of the issue with the perceived attitude or belief portrayed in the message. When messages
do not resonate with receivers, or if messages present ideas that strongly contrast receivers’
attitudes or beliefs, communicators have difficulty achieving desired outcomes from the
messages. This theory is composed of three concepts to explain how individuals judge
communication messages: latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment; assimilation
and contrast, and ego-involvement (Sherif & Sherif, 1967).
Attitudes, conceptualized as learned evaluation of an object or concept that affects an
individual’s thoughts and actions, are developed within a social environment and are fairly stable
once formed (Perloff, 2014; Ruth & Rumble, 2019; Sherif & Sherif, 1967). Attitudes reflect
relationships with people, places, or things (Sherif & Sherif, 1967) and exist on a continuum of
various positions (Perloff, 2014). Three latitudes describe the level of acceptability of a message
in relation to an individual’s attitude: acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment (Sherif &
Sherif, 1967). A latitude of acceptance includes “the individual’s most acceptable position along
with all other positions they find acceptable […] while a latitude of rejection is simply the
opposite” (Ruth & Rumble, 2019, p. 2). Latitudes of noncommitment include positions for which
individuals neither agree nor disagree (Sherif & Sherif, 1967). Assimilation and contrast offer
further explanations for how individuals make judgements toward scientific communication
messages (Ruth & Rumble, 2019; Sherif & Sherif, 1967). Individuals use their personal attitudes
as a reference to which they compare the message, and this results in a subjective judgement. In
assimilation, an individual may assume a message is more similar to their attitude than it is in
reality (Granberg, 1993). During contrast, individuals believe the message is more distinct from
their own position than it actually is. The concepts of assimilation and contrast can hinder
exposure to alternative views, especially among individuals with extreme views, who often have
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large latitudes of rejection (Perloff, 2014; Sherif et al., 1965). The third component of SJT, egoinvolvement, describes the situation in which individuals view messages they believe affect their
core values (Sherif et al., 1965). When an individual experiences a high level of egoinvolvement, there is often an associated large latitude of rejection. These individuals are more
difficult to persuade, as they reject messages that misalign with their views, though they quickly
assimilate to messages that align with their attitudes. Ego-involved individuals experience
selective perception, in which they interpret messages in line with their attitudes and beliefs,
regardless of how they might objectively align with the issue (Ruth & Rumble, 2019).
SJT demonstrates it is difficult to change the minds of people with strong attitudes, and
thus has been used to study controversial topics such as politics, genetically-modified food, and
global warming (Ruth & Rumble, 2019; Sherif & Sherif, 1967). With climate change,
individuals may not have the time nor the capacity to understand the issue and thus rely on the
views of trusted sources to make these judgements (Thaker et al., 2019). Within the U.S., trust in
science is also associated with attitudes, making SJT a relevant theory through which to
investigate the impact of government influence, especially due to the close association between
policy support and climate change belief. Because climate change is a collective issue, people
who feel a lack of efficacy as an individual may feel enhanced efficacy when acting as part of a
group, supporting the power of social identity on perceptions of scientific issues (Merzdorf et al.,
2019). Individuals' social values, identities, and worldviews interact in an iterative process with
attitude and scientific information to continuously impact their perceptions of environmental
issues (Pechar et al., 2018). In addition to SJT’s focus on perceptions and attitudes, including
knowledge as an additional variable may enhance the predictive capacity of models examining
perceptions of government control related to climate change, as previous studies indicated
knowledge is an important precursor to attitudes related to climate change (Tobler et al., 2012).
Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this study was to determine if perceived government control on
environmental behavior impacted perceptions and knowledge of climate change. Three
objectives guided the study: 1) describe respondents’ perceptions of government
autonomy/control on environmental behavior, perceptions of climate change, and knowledge of
climate change; 2) determine if political affiliation, political ideology, and perceptions of
government autonomy/control on environmental behavior predicted perceptions of climate
change; and 3) determine if political affiliation, political ideology, and perceptions of
government autonomy/control on environmental behavior predicted knowledge of climate
change.
Methods
The quantitative study described here was part of a larger research project focused on
determining public perceptions of water and climate change issues in the U.S. (see Gibson,
Fortner et al., 2021; Gibson, Lamm et al., 2021a; Gibson, Lamm et al., 2021b; Mayfield-Smith et
al., 2021). Four sections of the survey instrument were developed and used: political affiliation
and ideology, perceptions of government control on environmental behavior (adapted from
Lavergne et al., 2010), knowledge of climate change, and perceptions of climate change.
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Instrumentation
A researcher-adapted online survey instrument was developed to achieve the study
objectives. The survey included demographic, multiple choice, true/false, and Likert-type
questions. Political affiliation was measured using a multiple-choice question. Respondents were
asked to select the option that best described their political affiliation: Republican, Democrat,
Independent, Nonaffiliated, and Other. Respondents were also asked to identify the response that
best described their political ideology on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = Very Liberal; 2 =
Liberal; 3 = Moderate; 4 = Conservative; 5 = Very Conservative).
A scale was used to measure perceptions of government autonomy or control over
environmental behavior developed by Lavergne et al. (2010). The scale, originally adapted from
work conducted by Green-Demers et al. (1994), consisted of two subscales designed to measure
perceptions of governmental pressure and autonomy-support for engaging in environmentallyconscious behavior (Lavergne et al., 2010). A four-item subscale measured respondents’
perceptions of government control over environmental behavior (Lavergne et al., 2010). These
questions when combined as a construct gauged the “extent to which individuals perceive that
the government imposes itself or pressures citizens into making environmental decisions”
(Lavergne et al., 2010, p. 172). The second subscale measured respondents’ perceptions of
government autonomy-support for engaging in environmentally-conscious behaviors. These
questions when combined as a construct gauged the “extent to which individuals perceive that
the government gives them choice when making environmental decisions” (Lavergne et al.,
2010, p. 172). Both scales utilized a series of statements where respondents indicated their level
of agreement or disagreement on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 - Strongly Disagree to 5 Strongly Agree. Responses to the scale items were averaged within each subscale to create
overall index scores that ranged from one to five. For the perceived government control on
environmental behavior scale, four items were reverse coded (Table 2) to ensure Likert-scale
data was interpreted from 1 (negative perception) to 5 (positive perception). The government
control scale had an alpha reliability of .90 post hoc and the government autonomy-support scale
had an alpha reliability of .80 post hoc, both exceeding minimum requirements of reliability
(Cronbach, 1951; Lavergne et al., 2010).
Climate change perceptions and knowledge was divided into two scales. The first scale
measured attitudes toward climate change on a Likert-type scale comprising eight items ranging
from 1 - strongly disagree to 5 - strongly agree. In order to elucidate the findings real limits were
assigned. The real limits of the scale were 1.00 - 1.49 = strongly disagree, 1.50 – 2.49 =
disagree, 2.50 – 3.49 = neither agree nor disagree, 3.50 – 4.49 = agree, and 4.50 – 5.00 =
strongly agree. Items measured respondents’ concern toward (adapted from Vedlitz et al., 2008)
and perceptions of climate change related to their state, the U.S., other countries, their family,
and their community (adapted from Vogt et al., 2008). Two additional questions in the scale
addressed respondents’ beliefs about the number and level of extreme weather events resulting
from climate change. These two questions were adapted from Abdel-Monem et al. (2014). A
reliability analysis of the instrument for the target population demonstrated the climate
perception scale had an alpha reliability of .88.
The second scale measured respondents’ knowledge about climate change, using a series
of true/false questions that had correct and incorrect responses identified. The climate change
knowledge subscale was adapted from Leiserowitz et al. (2010). Example statements included:
global warming will cause some places to get wetter, while others will get drier (true); scientists’
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computer models are too unreliable to predict the climate of the future (false); and global
warming will cause temperatures to increase by roughly the same amount in all countries (false;
Leiserowitz et al., 2010). A knowledge score was calculated as the number of correct answers
out of 11; the number of items in the knowledge subscale.
The survey was reviewed by a panel of experts to determine face validity (Zamanzadeh et
al., 2014). The panel included faculty with expertise in survey design, natural resource issues,
agricultural and environmental communication, and educational research. Prior to data collection
the University of Georgia Institutional Review Board approved the study. A pilot test was then
conducted with 50 individuals who were representative of the population of interest.
Data Collection and Analysis
Data were collected using Qualtrics, an online survey platform in September of 2020.
One limitation of online surveys is that responses are limited to residents with access to a
computer and internet, which impacts the generalizability of the results (Ary et al., 2010). The
researchers used non-probability opt-in sampling methods, a technique often used in public
opinion research (Baker et al., 2013). Respondents were compensated by Qualtrics in accordance
with their standard protocols for recruitment.
Non-probability opt-in sampling can lead to selection, exclusion, and participation bias
(Baker et al., 2013) and is acknowledged as a limitation. The literature, however, demonstrates
its efficacy within social science research (Twyman, 2008; Vavreck & River, 2008). Previous
studies have shown non-probability samples utilizing weighting techniques to adjust for error
introduced can yield results that are as robust as probability-based samples (Twyman, 2008;
Vavreck & Rivers, 2008). Therefore, in this study, data were weighted post hoc using poststratification methods (Kalton & Flores-Cervantes, 2003). The 2010 U.S. Census data were used
to weight the dataset based on geographic location, age, gender, and race to ensure the
respondents represented the target population (Baker et al., 2013; Lamm & Lamm, 2019; United
States Census Bureau, 2010). An additional limitation was that data collection occurred during
the COVID-19 pandemic, which may have influenced individuals’ responses to survey items and
should be considered in the interpretation of the results. However, through weighting data post
hoc we have attempted to mitigate potential errors introduced through this limitation.
Demographics
The population of interest were U.S. residents 18 years and older. A total of 1,049 usable
responses were obtained. The respondents were 50.0% male and 50.0% female (Table 1). The
average respondent was White (72.4%), 35 years or older (66.0%), and had at least some college
education (78.6%). The majority of respondents identified as Democrats (41.3%) or Republicans
(33.2%), with few respondents identifying as Independents (19.7%), non-affiliated (5.1%), or
other (0.8%). Additionally, 33.5% of respondents identified as liberal or very liberal, 36.6% as
moderate, and 29.8% as conservative or very conservative.
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Table 1
Demographics of respondents (N = 1,049)
Sex
Male
Female
Age
18-34 years
35-54 years
55+ years
Racea
White
Black/African American
Asian or Pacific Islander
American Indian/Alaska Native
Other
Ethnicity
Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
Education
Less than 12th grade
High school diploma
Some college
2-year college degree
4-year college degree
Graduate or Professional degree
Family Income
Less than $24,999
$25,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $149,999
$150,000 - $249,999
$250,000 or more
Political Affiliation
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Non-affiliated
Other
Political Ideology
Very liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Very conservative

F

%

525
524

50.0
50.0

353
349
350

34.5
33.2
32.8

759
148
102
33
22

72.4
14.1
9.7
3.1
2.1

99
950

9.4
90.6

22
202
204
109
272
240

2.1
19.3
19.4
10.4
25.9
22.9

185
240
215
256
101
52

17.6
22.9
20.5
24.4
9.6
5.0

348
433
207
53
8

33.2
41.3
19.7
5.1
0.8

146
206
384
188
125

13.9
19.6
36.6
17.9
11.9

Note: aRespondents were allowed to select more than one race.
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Data were analyzed using SPSS 26. Descriptive statistics were used to address objective
one. Inferential statistics, including bivariate correlations and multiple linear regressions, were
then used to address objectives two and three. Assumptions of normality, non-multicollinearity,
and homoscedasticity were met for the independent variables in the multiple linear regression
analyses, ensuring normal distribution of the data (Field, 2013).
Results
Objective 1: Perceptions of Government Autonomy/Control and Perceptions and Knowledge
of Climate Change
The majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they had autonomy related to
engagement in environmental behavior (see Table 2). Generally, they felt they had the choice to
use strategies provided by the government to help the environment (57.8%), that the government
gave them the freedom to make their own decisions regarding the environment (58.0%), and that
they had the choice to participate in government-established environmental programs (60.9%).
Table 2
Perceptions of Government Autonomy-Support on Environmental Behavior (N = 1,049)

%

%

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
%

I feel I have the choice to use the
strategies provided by the
government in order to help the
environment.

17.3

40.5

30.4

6.9

5.0

The government gives me the freedom
to make my own decisions in
regards to the environment.

15.4

42.6

31.3

6.2

4.5

I feel I have the choice to participate in
the environmental programs
established by the government.

19.2

41.7

28.4

6.0

4.8

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

%

%

When asked their perceptions of government control on environmental behavior,
respondents did not indicate a majority agreement or disagreement (see Table 3). Around one
third of respondents felt the government pressured people to adopt environmentally-conscious
behaviors (37.6%), that the government imposes its environmental strategies (36.5%), that the
government tries to force the adoption of environmental behaviors (31.6%), and that the
government wants them to feel guilty when someone does nothing for the environment (32.6%).
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Table 3
Perceptions of Government Control on Environmental Behavior (N = 1,049)

%

%

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
%

I think the government puts a lot of
pressure on people to adopt
environmentally-conscious
behaviors.

10.5

27.1

29.9

20.8

11.7

I feel the government imposes its
environmental strategies on us.

11.4

25.1

31.1

21.1

11.3

I feel that the government is trying to
force me to adopt environmental
behaviors.

9.3

22.3

30.5

23.3

14.6

I feel the government wants to make me
feel guilty when I do nothing for the
environment.

10.6

22.0

29.3

22.2

15.9

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

%

%

The majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed they were very concerned about
climate change, that climate change would significantly impact their state, that climate change
would significantly impact the U.S., that climate change would significantly impact other
countries, that climate change would have a negative impact, that the number of extreme weather
events will increase as a result of climate change, and the level of extremity of extreme weather
events will increase as a result of climate change (see Table 4). Conversely, a majority of
respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed climate change would have a positive impact. On
average, the majority of respondents agreed they perceived climate change as having a negative
impact (M = 3.82, SD = .87). A reliability analysis revealed a high level of internal consistency
for the climate change perception construct (α = 0.95).

https://newprairiepress.org/jac/vol106/iss3/6
DOI: 10.4148/1051-0834.2441

10

Sanders et al.: Perceived Government Control and Climate Change

Table 4
Perceptions of Climate Change (N = 1,049)
Strongly
Agree

Agree

%
33.7

%
35.1

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree
%
17.3

Climate change will significantly impact my
state

26.6

36.5

Climate change will significantly impact the
U.S.

36.7

Climate change will significantly impact other
countries

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

%
7.3

%
6.7

23.5

7.8

5.5

34.8

18.4

6.0

4.1

35.9

37.0

18.1

4.9

4.1

I believe climate change will have a negative
impact

34.6

33.7

21.8

5.3

4.6

I believe the number of extreme weather events
will increase as a result of climate change
(e.g. hurricanes, droughts, floods)

35.5

35.4

19.6

5.4

4.1

I believe the level of extremity of extreme
weather events will increase as a result of
climate change (e.g. hurricanes, droughts,
floods)

34.1

36.1

20.5

5.3

3.9

I am very concerned about climate change

When measuring climate knowledge, respondents, on average, selected the correct
answer (true or false) for 62.5% of the questions (M = 6.87, SD = 2.53), with a minimum score
of 0 and a maximum score of 11. For nine of the 11 questions, a majority of respondents selected
the correct answer (see Table 5). The two statements for which a majority of respondents
selected the incorrect answer were “in the 1970s, most scientists were predicting an ice age”
(false; 52.2% incorrect) and “global warming will cause temperatures to increase by roughly the
same amount in all countries” (false; 54.0% incorrect).
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Table 5
Responses to Climate Change Knowledge Question (N = 1,049)
Correct
Responses
Global warming will cause some places to get wetter, while others will get drier.

%
79.8

The decade from 2000-2009 was warmer than any other decade since 1850.

72.8

Scientists can't predict the weather more than a few days in advance – they can't
possibly predict the climate of the future.

54.1

Global warming will increase crop yields in some places, and decrease it in others.

66.7

Scientists' computer models are too unreliable to predict the climate of the future.

56.4

In the 1970s, most scientists were predicting an ice age.

47.8

The Earth's climate has changed naturally in the past, therefore humans are not the
cause of global warming.

55.7

Global warming will cause temperatures to increase by roughly the same amount in all
countries.

46.0

Any recent global warming is caused by the sun.

66.1

The record snowstorms this winter in the eastern United States prove that global
warming is not happening.

68.4

The earth is actually cooling, not warming.

73.3

Objective 2: Predictive Capacity of Government Autonomy/Control Beliefs on Perceptions
of Climate Change
Correlations were used to examine the relationships between perceptions of government
control, political affiliation, political ideology, perceptions of climate change and climate change
knowledge (see Table 6). The rate of multicollinearity among the independent variables was
small to moderate; thus, should not affect further regression analysis.
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Table 6
Relationships between perceptions of government control, political affiliation, and political ideology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2

.506**

3

-.223**

4

.271**

.438**
-0.005

5

.221**

0.034

6

.213**

.199**

7

-0.003

8

-.222**

9

-.231**

1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4

-.274**

-

-

-0.055
.104**

.108**

.084**

-.073*

.103**

.159**
.216**
.277**

.091**

-0.026

.188**

0.033

.209**

0.05

.227**

-.073*

12

13

-

0.03

.199**
.306**
.188**
.148**
.125**

-.376**

-

-.231**

-.355**

-

-.182**

-.279**

-.172**

-

-.206**

-.199**

.267**

.366**

-

.283**

-.094**

-.205**

-.231**

-.591**

-

**

0.059

.250**

.062*

-0.03

-.077*

**

-0.058

.270**

-0.057

-.123**

-.349**

-.416**

-

-0.044

0.005

-0.021

-.073*

-0.042

-.081**

.150**

-0.017

-0.058

-.163**

-.193**

-.114**

-

-.087**

**

0.032

-.070*

-0.035

-0.016

0.002

0.016

0.035

-.062*

-.073*

-0.043

0.02

.082

14

.223**

.356**

11

.172

.130

-

Note. *p < .05, **p < .01; 1 = Climate change perception, 2 = Climate change knowledge, 3 = Government control, 4 = Government support, 5 =
Very liberal, 6 = Liberal, 7 = Moderate, 8 = Conservative, 9 = Very conservative, 10 = Republican, 11 = Democrat, 12 = Independent, 13 = Nonaffiliated, 14 = Other.
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Multiple linear regression was used to determine if political affiliation and political
ideology predicted perceptions of climate change. The model was statistically significant (F =
34.11, p < .001) and predicted 20.8% of the variance (see Table 7). When perceived government
autonomy-support and perceived government control on environmental behavior were added to
the model, the model remained significant (F = 44.59, p < .001) and predicted 29.4% of the
variance. The change in R2 was statistically significant, indicating Model 2 was more effective at
predicting the respondents’ perceptions of climate change based on their perception of
government control despite political affiliation or ideology. Democrats exhibited a higher level
of climate change perception than all other political affiliations. When compared to moderates,
conservative and very conservative respondents exhibited a lower level of climate change
perception or concern while respondents exhibiting liberal and very liberal political ideologies
exhibited higher levels of climate change concern.
Table 7
Government Control Predictive Capacity on Respondents’ Perceptions of Climate Change
Model 1
Model 2
2
R
0.21*
0.31*
2
ΔR
0.09*
a
Political Affiliation
Republican
-0.40*
-0.36*
Independent
-0.36*
-0.31*
No political affiliation
-0.38*
-0.30*
Other political affiliation
-0.94*
-0.67*
b
Political Ideology
Very liberal
0.34*
0.25*
Liberal
0.25*
0.20*
Conservative
-0.34*
-0.31*
Very conservative
-0.43*
-0.39*
Government Control
-0.16*
Government Support
0.29*
Note. *p < .05; aDemocrat was left out of the model as the comparison variable; bModerate was left out of
the model as the comparison variable.

A second multiple linear regression model was used to determine if political affiliation
and ideology predicted knowledge of climate change. The model was statistically significant (F
= 19.27, p < .001) and predicted 12.9% of the variance (see Table 8). Additionally, when
perceived government autonomy-support and perceived government control on environmental
behavior were added in Model 2, the model remained significant (F = 37.51, p < .001) and
predicted 26.5% of the variance. The change in R2 was statistically significant, indicating Model
2 was more effective at predicting respondent’s knowledge of climate change based on their
perception of government influence. In both models, political affiliation and ideology had a
statistically significant predictive capacity for knowledge of climate change. Democrats
exhibited a higher level of climate change knowledge than all other political affiliations.
Republicans and Other political affiliations exhibited significantly lower levels of climate change
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knowledge. When compared to moderate respondents, liberal political ideologies exhibited
higher levels of climate change knowledge, while conservative and very conservative
respondents exhibited lower levels.
Table 8
Government Control Predictive Capacity on Respondents’ Knowledge of Climate Change
Model 1
Model 2
2
R
0.13*
0.27*
2
ΔR
0.14*
Political Affiliationa
Republican
Independent
No political affiliation
Other political affiliation
Political Ideologyb
Very liberal
Liberal
Conservative
Very conservative
Government Control
Government Support

-1.07*
-0.25
-0.45
-2.59*

-0.76*
-0.11
-0.30
-2.00*

-0.21
0.57*
-0.78*
-1.22*

-0.28
0.48*
-0.60*
-0.80*
-0.94*
0.25*

Note. * p < .05; aDemocrat was left out of the model as the comparison variable; bModerate was left
out of the model as the comparison variable.

Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations
Given policy is the primary way in which environmental protection and regulation are
introduced to society, and public support for policy change is crucial, a clear understanding of
the factors influencing perceptions of environmental policy is needed to direct climate change
communication efforts. Previous research has emphasized the role of political affiliation and
ideology in individual perceptions of climate change. The current study went a step further by
examining perceptions and knowledge of climate change related to political ideology and
perceptions of government control. The results indicated political affiliation and ideology were
significant predictors of climate change perceptions, but perceptions of government control of
environmental behavior add to the discussion. These findings support previous literature
detailing the predictive value of political affiliation and ideology on climate change beliefs
(Gromet et al., 2013; Merzdorf et al., 2019) but also supports the work of Pechar et al. (2018)
and Lavergne et al. (2010) in exploring additional factors related to political ideology. Despite
literature suggesting moving beyond political affiliation and ideology to explain climate change
knowledge and perceptions, the findings suggest political affiliation and ideology are still
significant predictors of climate change perception, at least in the U.S. Thus, when creating
messages segmented for multiple audiences, communicators should continue to attend to
political affiliation and ideology while taking perceptions of government control into account.
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Political affiliation and ideology also predicted climate change knowledge. Overall,
respondents had low levels of climate change knowledge, answering just over half of the
knowledge questions correctly. When perceived government control of environmental behavior
was included in the model, Republicans, conservatives, and very conservative respondents had a
negative, statistically significant relationship, indicating that negative perceptions of government
control significantly predicted climate change knowledge when compared to Democrats and
moderates. Conversely, liberals had a significant positive relationship with climate change
knowledge, but very liberal respondents did not, indicating a liberal ideology (more positive
perceptions of government) significantly predicted climate change knowledge when compared to
moderates.
According to Lavergne et al. (2010), when communicating about climate change and
associated environmental policy, science communicators working with agencies, researchers or
government entities should place more emphasis on supporting autonomy and appearing less
controlling in more conservative regions of the U.S. However, when drafting policy and
communicating with a more liberal audience about climate change, government control on
environmental behavior may be perceived as a positive attribute for climate mitigation policy.
Therefore, climate change and environmental policy communication messages should be framed
as supported by government entities through power and influence.
Previous research has found perceptions of climate change are more influential on public
policy support than knowledge of climate change (Merzdorf et al., 2019; van der Linden, 2015).
Given the results aligned with party and ideological divisions, the notion that socio-political
identity divisions influence individuals’ acceptance of controversial messaging strategies in
science communication was supported. Thus, communication strategies that are identitysupportive for both parties should be utilized moving forward (Merzdorf et al., 2019; Ruth &
Rumble, 2019; Sherif & Sherif, 1967). These messages targeting more conservative political
ideologies might emphasize free market solutions to climate change (Dixon et al., 2017) though
Severson and Coleman (2015) suggested frames emphasizing science, secular morality, and
economic equity have potential to increase widespread public support for climate-mitigation
policies. Additionally, Wolsko et al. (2016) reported evidence that a binding moral frame, in
which natural resource protection was framed as a way to obey authority, defend nature’s purity,
and demonstrate one’s patriotism to the U.S, may shift political conservatives’ proenvironmental attitudes.
Increasing public trust in science is critical for evidence-based policymaking, but a
clearer understanding of the factors influencing scientific trust and distrust is a vital step in this
process (Pechar et al., 2018). The current study advances the literature in several key ways. First,
knowledge and perceptions of climate change are distinct and interact with political
identification in different ways, enhancing perspective- and attitude-based messaging strategies
(building from SJT) related to climate change (Tobler et al., 2012). Second, positive government
perceptions were related to greater concern about climate change, while negative government
perceptions related to climate change denial. Even though political affiliation and ideology were
significant predictors, factoring in perceptions of government control as a broader
conceptualization of the ideology increases the explanatory and predictive capacity of the model.
Third, literature aligned social identity with climate change perceptions and connected the
influence of these groups with judgements of communication messages through SJT (Sherif &
Sherif, 1967). SJT posits that social groups and political cues inform individuals' values as a
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basis of judgement. Therefore, the implications of social identity on the political polarization
communication effects are seen not just in the U.S., but globally.
The results indicated framing climate change communication messages should be done in
conjunction with political ideology perspectives, especially with more conservative audiences, to
increase message uptake (Antonio & Brulle, 2011). For example, using loss frames focused on
the negative economic impact of climate change may be more effective due to the more
conservative, neoliberal worldview. Framing becomes critical in the post-trust communication
climate, as stories covering science from all sides may give equal weight to both true and false
information (Merzdorf et al., 2019). Hence, aligning the science with political views related to
neoliberalism for audiences less likely to believe in climate change may increase message
uptake, rather than giving increased airtime to false claims. Additionally, Veldman (2019)
suggested framing climate change messages from a local perspective rather than a global
perspective when targeting a more conservative audience. Framing becomes important when
creating strategic messages aligned with SJT as people compare their own attitudes toward the
perceived attitudes within a message (Ruth & Rumble, 2019; Sherif & Sherif, 1967), which
impacts the acceptance of various messages particularly from an environmental context.
Moving forward, future studies should investigate these concepts – perceived government
control on environmental behavior, political affiliation, and political ideology – with more
attention to various demographic characteristics. According to Pearson and Schuldt (2015),
public opinion on climate change may be less polarized for racial and ethnic minorities.
Additionally, political ideology varies across the U.S., as a liberal in the Southern U.S. may be
more conservative than a liberal in the Western U.S. Future studies could also compare these
results based on states or regions within the U.S. Additionally, much scholarship related to this
topic is U.S.-centric (Huber, 2020; Pechar et al., 2018). Diversifying the countries investigated
could yield insights about the effect of government perceptions on climate change policy support
around the world considering it is an issue requiring global efforts to solve.
The results also have implications for the training of future agricultural and
environmental science communicators. Operationalizing characteristics of political ideology
helps demonstrate the complexity of socially-influenced perceptions that impact message
acceptance or rejection. The first implication is that messaging strategies developed around the
deficit model of communication are inherently limited as knowledge is not as significant a
predictor of message acceptance as attitudes and pre-existing socio-political perceptions
(Merzdorf et al., 2019; Munshi et al., 2020). Thus, increasing knowledge should not be a primary
communication strategy, as framing around value orientations may be more effective (Steel et
al., 2008). When communicating about contentious topics, communicators must understand the
socio-political context of an issue, both in the underlying politics as well as the associated policy
implications that emerge from solutions-based messaging (Pechar et al., 2018; Ruth & Rumble,
2019). There is more than one underlying cause for political ideology formation, and these are
closely related to sociocultural contexts (Sherif & Sherif, 1967). Thus, communicators should be
trained in identifying component parts of a specific demographic, like political ideology, so as to
not alienate audiences due to an incomplete assessment of their underlying value orientations
(Botzen et al., 2016; Steel et al., 2008). Curriculum addressing the formation of socio-political
value orientations may enhance future communicators’ ability to navigate a complex and
contentious communications environment.
The findings implied political ideology and perceptions of government need to be
considered when crafting communication messages to increase positive perceptions of specific
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climate policy. Other aspects of political ideology, such as nationalism and populism (Kulin et
al., 2021), should be further examined and potentially integrated into climate communication
efforts. Additionally, when political ideology is used as a predictor for scientific trust, the
perspective is limited, as liberals and conservatives do not distrust or trust science generally;
rather, it is innovation-specific (Pechar et al., 2018). These diverse perspectives cannot be
explained solely by ideology as differences in opinion on environmental innovations or issues
stem from policy implications, largely connected to whether they trust or distrust the
government, not science specifically. The framing of messages also influences message uptake
and subsequent behavior (Li & Su, 2018; Rohling et al., 2016). Thus, planning communication
messages through a government-perception framework rather than political ideology may
increase public support for pro-climate change policy by framing specific messages congruently
with complex components of political affiliation and ideology.
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